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Financial Distress Risk in Initial Public Offerings: How Much Do Venture Capitalists Matter? 
 
1. Introduction  
Are venture capital (VC)-backed Initial Public Offering (IPO) firms less financially distressed 
than other IPO firms, and if so, do VCs contribute to the financial stability of portfolio companies after 
the IPO? If VC investors do reduce financial risk of investee firms, is this risk-reduction caused by VCs’ 
screening of portfolio companies, or by the direct effect of VC investments in reducing financial risk? 
Stated differently, is there a relationship between the VCs’ value-added intensity and the level of a post-
IPO firm’s financial distress? Finally, are certain types of VC firms (high reputation vs. low reputation 
and bank affiliated vs. independent) better at reducing the financial distress risk of investee firms than 
other ones? These questions have long been empirically debated, but have picked up impetus in the wake 
of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, which emphasized the need for managers and regulators to keep the 
risk-taking of financial institutions and public companies at reasonable levels.  
There are at least three arguments supporting the idea that VCs contribute to financial market 
stability by bringing public firms that show a lower risk of financial distress during the post-IPO period. 
First, VCs undertake an intensive screening and selection process in order to pick “winning firms” that 
have favorable future business prospects (Amit, Brander, and Zott, 1998; Gompers and Lerner, 2001; 
Baum and Silvermann, 2004; Ueda, 2004; Casamatta and Haritchabalet, 2007; Chemmanur, Krishnan, 
and Nandy, 2011). The screening process involves selecting firms with specific characteristics that should 
lead to a lower risk of financial distress during the post-investment period (screening effect). The 
selection of firms with a low risk of financial distress should be even more pronounced in the case of 
captive VCs (mainly bank-affiliated and corporate VCs), which tend to be more risk-adverse than 
independent VCs (Manigart, de Waele, Wright, Robbie, Desbrières, Sapienza, and Beekman, 2002; 
Croce, D’Adda, and Ughetto, 2015). Indeed, independent VCs have a high risk tolerance and pursuing 
higher capital gains preserves their future ability to raise funding from third parties. Captive VCs have 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
3 
 
less pressure to maximize investment returns because they can raise additional funds from the parent 
company they are affiliated with.  
Second, VCs supply portfolio firms with the equity capital needed to expand their business, and 
enable firms to have a robust capital structure to meet any contracted principal and interest payments 
(financial effect) (Kaplan, and Schoar, 2005; Croce, Martí, and Murtinu, 2013). Finally, VCs are also 
builders of “winning firms” because they add value to portfolio firms by providing them with coaching 
(Jain and Kini, 1995; Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy, 2011; Croce, Martí, 
and Murtinu, 2013; Cumming, Grilli, and Murtinu, 2014), effective monitoring (Kaplan and Strömberg, 
2003; Cumming, 2005; Cumming, Grilli, and Murtinu, 2014), and valuable business contacts (Hsu, 2006; 
Lindsey, 2008; Wang and Wang, 2012). As a result, the level of financial soundness of firms brought 
public with VC-backing is likely to be higher than that of non-VC-backed firms, even though their 
financial soundness at the VC’s investment date might well be analogous to that of non-VC-backed firms 
(value-added effect). This should be even more true for companies backed by high reputable VCs, as 
several studies (Lee and Wahal, 2004; Nahata, 2008; Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh, 2011) 
document that more reputable VCs are able to select better-quality firms and exhibit more active post-IPO 
involvement in the corporate governance of their investee firms. 
Despite the arguments discussed above, the nature of the relationship between the VC-backing 
and the IPOs’ risk of financial distress may be unclear since there are at least two reasons to expect VC 
backing to be associated with bringing riskier firms public. The first explanation is the certification effect 
(Megginson and Weiss, 1991), which predicts that VCs, especially those with a high reputation, make it 
easier for portfolio firms to obtain external financing, such as equity investment or bank debt financing 
(Croce, D’Adda, and Ughetto, 2015). The presence of a multi-billion dollar venture debt market1 that 
                                                          
1
 Venture debt is a type of debt financing provided to VC-backed firms by specialized lenders to fund working 
capital or capital expenses. Unlike traditional bank loans, venture debt is available to startups and growth firms that 
do not have positive cash flows or significant assets to use as collateral. Although quantitative data about venture 
debt industry are hard to come by, venture debt is commonly used for start-up capital structures (Ibrahim, 2010). 
VC-backed companies such as Google and Facebook have used venture in their capital structures to gain first-to-
market advantage and to minimize the need to obtain expensive and scarce (at the time) external equity financing.  
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accounts for a substantial percentage of the capital raised each year by VC-backed firms corroborates the 
certification effect and shows that VC financing and debt financing coexist in reality. This is particularly 
important because if the use of debt delays the dilutive effects of an increase in the number of shares—
which will cause a decrease in both the firm’s performance and the VC’s internal rate of return—this can 
induce a higher risk of financial distress (Kaplan and Stein, 1993). In addition to allowing risky portfolio 
firms to access greater amounts of equity and debt financing than they could otherwise, prestigious VC 
backing also allows portfolio companies to access public capital markets earlier in their life cycles, when 
these companies are quite risky, than would otherwise be possible. 
The second reason to expect that that VCs might be associated with very risky investee firms 
relates to the grandstanding hypothesis proposed by Gompers (1996). Since a large part of a VC firm’s 
reputation come from its ability to bring portfolio companies public, and since establishing reputation is 
critical for future fundraising, VCs have an incentive to bring firms they back public too quickly. This 
would be particularly enticing for low reputation VCs. Thus, these portfolio firms can end up with high 
risk of financial distress as a result of having gone public prematurely. 
Ultimately, in the presence of contrasting predictions about the role of VC backing in IPOs, 
whether VC-backed firms are less financially distressed than are other firms and whether VC firm 
reputation is associated with lower financial distress risk by investee firms are empirical questions that we 
seek to answer by analyzing a sample of 1,593 US IPOs between 1990 and 2007, about 27.5% (438) of 
which are VC-backed IPOs. Following several papers (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006 and Tyknova and 
Borrell, 2012, among others) we use the Z’’-score (Altman, Hartzell and Peck, 1995) as our primary 
measure of the firm’s risk of financial distress. We find that VC-backed companies on average exhibit a 
higher Z”-score, meaning that, all else equal, these firms are characterized by a lower risk of financial 
distress than are non-VC-backed portfolio companies. As a robustness check, we also conduct univariate 
analyses employing alternative measures of risk for financial distress, such as ZM-score (Zmijewski, 
1984), O-score (Ohlson, 1980), and Equity ratio (e.g., Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2006). Results from these 
robustness tests are analogous to the ones we observe using the Z”-score measure.  
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We next estimate OLS regressions, testing whether a firm’s financial distress risk is a function of 
a dummy variable for VC-backing and various other firm-specific characteristics, macroeconomic 
variables, and industry and state dummies. Consistent with the univariate analysis, we document 
significantly different risks of financial distress between VC- and non-VC-backed IPOs, which is robust 
to all the financial distress measures used. This result, however interesting on its own, emphasizes the 
need to determine whether the lower risk of financial distress risk for VC-backed IPOs comes from the 
VCs’ screening role only, or from the financial effect and value-added effect as well (henceforth, we will 
use “treatment effect” to refer to both financial effect and value-added effect). The use of OLS 
estimations does not allow us to address this issue because as the provision and receipt of venture funding 
represents the result of an endogenous choice by firms and VCs, as Sørensen (2007) clearly shows, which 
is reflected not only in the investment by VCs but also in their eventual exit. This suggests a nonrandom 
distribution and characteristics of VC-backed IPOs (Lee and Wahal, 2004). Thus, we employ a matching 
technique, where the one-to-one nearest neighbor is matched without replacement (Heckman, Ichimura, 
and Todd, 1997), which allows us to control for observed heterogeneity among treated and untreated 
firms, represented by the characteristics included in the matching process. This approach starts with the 
estimation of a logit model for the endogenous choice variable (VC=1 for VC backing, 0, otherwise) with 
a vector of X variables (age, size, 2-digit SIC code dummies, headquarters-state dummies). Then, the 
predicted probability is used as the propensity score and each VC-backed IPO is matched with the non-
VC-backed IPO with the closest propensity score. Once selection bias is controlled for, we estimate OLS 
regressions. Consistent with our previous results documenting the positive effects of the role of VC-
backing in IPOs, we find a negative causal effect of VC financing on the risk of financial distress for 
firms receiving such financing. In so doing, we document the VC-backed IPOs are less financial 
distressed than other IPOs due to the treatment effects.  
Since the propensity score matching analysis is not without flaws—specifically, it does not 
control for the effect of unobserved factors—we perform two robustness tests in order to check the 
resilience of our results. First, we include in the OLS specification the lagged dependent variable to 
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predict the current year’s value of the dependent variable (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Tykvová and 
Borrell, 2012). Indeed, if VC funding is itself a result of unobserved factors related to financial distress 
risk, controlling for lagged financial distress risk should eliminate spurious effects resulting from such 
endogeneity. One again, we document a negative relationship between VC backing and the risk of 
financial distress for IPO firms. 
Second, while restricting the analysis to the VC-backed IPOs, we examine the effect of VC 
investment intensity (measured as both the length of the investment and the presence or absence of a VC 
syndication) on the level of a firm’s financial distress and find that the level of financial distress declines 
as VC investment intensity increases. This result, which is resilient to all the financial distress measures, 
enables us to provide further evidence in favor of the treatment effect hypothesis.  
Since VC investments have favorable effects on the IPOs’ risk of financial distress, and as 
various studies (e.g., Lee and Wahal, 2004; Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh, 2011) have pointed out 
that more reputable VCs are able to better solve their role compared to low reputable ones, it is really 
interesting to know what is the role of VC reputation in explaining post-IPO risk of financial distress. 
Using a reputation measure based on the VC firm’s funding market share, we find that companies backed 
by more reputable VCs exhibit higher levels of financial distress risk than others. Furthermore, 
implementing a standard Heckman (1979) 2-step selection procedure we report results that are robust to 
the correction of selection bias possibly induced by VC firms’ choice of investee companies. Since these 
results are somewhat unexpected, we analyze them further by decomposing the Z”-score. Similar to 
Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh (2011), we find that companies backed by more reputable VCs 
perform better than others. However, we document that this success comes, at least partially, from more 
aggressive investment (lower liquidity assets on total assets ratio) and financing policy (lower capital 
ratio). Indeed, greater investments in long-term assets and greater use of debt financing are associated 
with higher operating performance and profitably, respectively, but also higher risk of financial distress. 
We perform an additional analysis by distinguishing and evaluating the impact of the different 
types of VCs. Following several studies (e.g., Croce, D’Adda, and Ughetto, 2015), we split the VC-
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backed IPOs sample into firms backed by bank affiliated VCs and firms backed by independent VCs. We 
find that bank affiliated VC-backed IPOs are safer compared to independent VC-backed IPOs. This result 
suggests that bank affiliated VCs are interested in the long-term growth of their portfolio firms in order to 
yield synergies with their core banking business (Hellman, Lindsey and Puri, 2008). 
 The last issue addressed in this paper is related to how the different risk of financial distress 
between VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs affects the cost of debt. In order to shed light on this 
issue we distinguish between the best and the worst firms. For example, concerning Z’’-score, firms are 
grouped into the three zones of discrimination identified by Altman Hartzell and Peck (1995): Distress 
Zone, Grey Zone and Safe Zone. The results suggest that as the financial risk decreases, the cost of debt 
decreases as well, though VC-backed IPOs always shows (i.e. for each class of financial distress risk) a 
lower cost of debt compared to other ones. 
Our paper complements previous research on the role of VC backing in IPOs.
2
 Existing studies 
find that investee firms are more likely to go public (Sørensen, 2007); obtain higher valuation and attract 
more reputable financial market players during the IPO process (Ivanov and Xie, 2010); show better 
performance in term of profitability (Jain and Kini, 1995), long-run market returns (Brav and Gompers, 
1997), and innovation (Cumming, 2007; Caselli, Gatti and Perrini, 2009) over the post-IPO period. While 
this literature is consistent with the notion that VC- are better than non-VC-backed firms in many aspects, 
our paper shows for the first time that VC-backed firms have lower risk of financial distress. However, 
we are aware of the fact that, as with other research (Jain and Kini, 1995; Chemmanur, Krishnan, and 
Nandy, 2011), our study suffers from a lack of observational data on the behavior of VC-backed firms 
during the pre-IPO period.
3
 
A recent paper by Croce, D’Adda, and Ughetto (2015) also investigates the relationship between 
                                                          
2
 Since there is a greater amount of information available for IPO firms, the impact on investee firms by VC 
investments exiting via IPOs have traditionally been more frequently studied in academic work than other VC 
investments (Cumming, Fleming, and Schwienbacher, 2006). 
3
 It is worth noting that we do not observe private firms’ risk of financial distress risk because in the US, only the 
approximately 15,000 SEC registrants plus certain regulated entities and firms for which lenders or contracts impose 
such requirements have publicly available financial statements (Hope, Thomas and Vyas, 2013). Thus, financial data 
for U.S. private firms have not been widely accessible.  
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VC investments and risk of financial distress for investee firms, demonstrating that VC-backed firms, 
particularly those backed by bank-affiliated VC investors, exhibit a significant increase in both debt 
exposure and risk of financial distress after the VC financing. Our study differs from theirs in several 
ways. First, Croce, D’Adda, and Ughetto (2015) focus on a relatively narrow sample of small and micro 
firms.
4
 Analyzing the role of VC in mitigating the risk of financial distress in IPO firms is fundamentally 
different from studying its impact on small and micro firms. Indeed, the risk of financial distress for IPO 
firms is of great importance given their large systemic relevance and the potential repercussion on 
financial market stability. Furthermore, the performance of an IPO firm has implications for a larger 
number of stakeholders (thousands of retail investors, institutional investors, underwriters, firm’s 
auditors, financial analysts and board members). Second, Croce, D’Adda, and Ughetto (2015) focus on 
European VC-backed firms. We believe that analyzing the US VC market has the following strengths. 
First, US VC investments account for a large portion of the global VC industry and VCs invest much 
larger funds in the US than in Europe.
5
 As such, studies focused on US market suffer fewer generalization 
concerns than those focused on European market. Second, US VCs are more active, skilled and 
experienced than their European counterparts (Schwienbacher, 2008; Hege, Palomino, and 
Schwienbacher, 2009). As a consequence, their investment decisions should be more aligned with 
theoretical predictions and should help scholars to better explain differences in performance and risk of 
financial distress between VC- and non-VC-backed firms. Third, the Croce, D’Adda, and Ughetto (2015) 
study is limited to distinguishing between bank-affiliated and independent VCs, we also provide evidence 
on VC reputation, showing that the greater success of highly-reputable firms, widely documented by 
previous studies (e.g., Nahata, 2008), depends on more aggressive investment and financing policy. 
                                                          
4
 The authors use VICO dataset that contains information on new high‐tech firms operating in several European 
countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom). Descriptive statistics about 
Vico dataset are reported by various researchers. For example, Bertoni and Tykvova (2012) exhibit that the average 
sales of 159 VC-backed firms extracted by VICO is €3.782 million. 
5
 Over the period 2006-2013, the total amount of VC investments in the United States was about $254.6 billion (on 
average, $31.8 billion dollars per year) accounting for the 67.8% of global VC investments. Over the same period in 
Europe the total amount of VC investments was about $55.4 billion (on average, $6.9 billion per year). Source of 
data: Global Venture Capital Insights and Trends 2014. 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
9 
 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains the research design. Section 3 discusses the 
empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 introduces further evidence on 
impact of VC’s reputation on firm’s financial distress risk and the final section concludes. 
 
2.         Research design 
2.1       Data and Sample 
Our sample consists of VC- and non-VC-backed IPOs that went public on US markets between 
1990 and 2007. We first determine whether a firm has been subject to a VC financing from THOMSON 
ONE database, which contains information on mergers and acquisitions, VC and buy-out transactions, 
and VC investor exit route. This yields an initial sample of 2,413 VC-backed IPOs. Second, we exclude 
financial firms such as banks, insurance companies, and pension funds—due to the fact that they are not 
directly comparable to industrial and other service firms (Mazzola and Marchisio, 2002; Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003; Martinez, Stohr, and Quiroga, 2007); nonprofit companies – social clubs, sports clubs, and 
schools (Martinez, Stohr, and Quiroga, 2007); and IPOs with an offer price of less than $5.00 and amount 
offered of less than $3 million (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Jain and Kini, 1994; Lee and Wahal, 2004). 
This yields a reduced sample of 942 VC-backed firms. Third, we match the rest of the sample with 
COMPUSTAT using the ticker symbol to extract accounting data for companies going public; this 
procedure rejects an additional 357 VC-backed IPOs lacking a valid ticker symbol. Fourth, we extract all 
other IPOs in COMPUSTAT meeting the data screens detailed above, which yields the potential universe 
of untreated sample of non-VC-backed IPOs. We then exclude companies for which we do not find 
complete accounting information for at least one fiscal year after the listing (the sample includes financial 
data for up to five years after the listing).  
The decision to exclude firms without full data exposes us to a trade-off between sample size and 
panel balance. On one hand, the non-exclusion of IPOs affected by missing value and without accounting 
information would allow us to have a bigger sample in term of number of observations. On the other 
hand, this would exclude the possibility of having a balanced panel. There is also a trade-off between the 
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number of years after the IPO to investigate and the probability of having a panel of data with missing 
value and/or without accounting information. Considering all these trade-offs, we opt for a balanced data 
panel without missing values and accounting information. Finally, because the portfolio company’s 
foundation year—which is needed to calculate firm age—is not available in COMPUSTAT, we 
supplement this in two different ways. For VC-backed IPOs, we extract this information from 
THOMSON ONE; for non-VC-backed IPOs, we hand-construct the age variable using the firm’s 
foundation year, via ticker symbol, on the FACTIVA database, which contains information mainly related 
to historical market data and financial news archives. As a result, our final sample consists of 1,593 IPOs, 
438 of which are VC-backed and 1,155 are not.  
Table 1 shows statistics on the IPO fiscal year’s total assets (in $ million), book value of equity, 
revenue, age, market value and Capex ratio. Consistent with other studies in this field (Megginson and 
Weiss, 1991; Lee and Wahal, 2004), VC-backed IPOs are younger and smaller than are non-VC-backed 
firms, and also have lower book values of equity, lower revenues, and smaller levels of total assets.  
**** Insert Table 1 about here **** 
2.2  Endogenity issues and descriptive statistics  
Consistent with the fact that the VCs tend to have a special appetite both for certain sectors and 
geographic areas
6, the VCs’ choice of target firm is not the result of a random selection process. 
Megginson and Weiss (1991, p. 882) underscore that “the cost and stringency of VC investment, as well 
as the sheer difficulty in obtaining it (venture capitalists typically fund less than one percent of all the 
proposals they receive), implies that only those firms which would benefit most from the services venture 
capitalists provide will be willing and able to accept such participation”. This clearly indicates a 
selection bias both because only better ﬁrms, especially in terms of growth prospects, can seek VC 
funding (Bertoni, Croce, and Guerini, 2012) and because VC investors can pick their targets from a huge 
group of possible investable firms.  
                                                          
6
 Over the first quarter of 2015, in US, the total amount invested by Venture Capital funds was 13.4 billion dollars 
and about 80% of this (11.0 billion dollars) was concentrated among just four States: California, Massachusetts, 
New York and Texas. Source of data: National Venture Capital Association – NVCA. 
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The industry distribution of our full sample of VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs across 2-
digit SIC codes is presented in Panel A of Table 2. VC-backed IPOs represent about 27.5% of the total 
sample. In line with the text above and with previous studies (e.g., Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Lee and 
Wahal, 2004), our sample shows a high variability across industry, from a minimum of one or two IPOs 
(e.g., SIC code 51) to a maximum of 88 IPOs (SIC code 73), where, obviously, in this latter case, the VCs 
show major interest in investing. We also find that VC-backed IPOs are concentrated in absolute terms. In 
fact, five sectors represented by SIC codes 73, 36, 28, 38 and 35 make up over 50% of the VC-backed 
IPOs subsample. These are: (a) Business services; (b) Electronic and other Electrical Equipment and 
Components, except Computer Equipment; (c) Chemicals and Allied Products; (d) Measuring, Analyzing, 
and Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical and Optical Goods; Watches and Clocks; and (e) 
Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment. 
**** Insert Table 2 about here **** 
Panel B shows the sample distribution by state in which the firm is headquartered. As expected, 
these data are highly concentrated, especially for VC-backed IPOs. Just four States—California (VC: 
32.65%; non-VC: 11.34%), Texas (VC: 4.57%; non-VC: 9.44%;), New York City (VC: 4.57%; non-VC: 
6.58%) and Massachusetts (VC: 10.50%; non-VC: 3.46%)— represent over 50% of the VC-backed IPOs 
subsample and 30% of non-VC-backed IPOs, respectively. Panel C shows the sample distribution of VC- 
and non-VC-backed IPOs for each calendar year. The distribution is consistent with “hot issue markets” 
(Ibbotson and Jaffe, 1975; Ritter, 1984) influencing firms to go public at non-random times. Instead, both 
VC-backed and non-VC-backed companies prefer to go public during particularly favorable periods, 
when market valuations are rising sharply—as demonstrated by the high number of VC- and non-VC-
backed IPOs listed during 1999 and 2007.  
2.3       Propensity score matching 
We now turn to estimating the effect of VC investments on firms’ financial distress after the IPO. 
One crucial aspect in the construction of the counterfactual sample is the selection of a valid control 
group. Many sample statistics shown in Table 2 are in line with previous US studies addressing VC. 
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Specifically, some authors (Gompers and Lerner, 2000; Megginson, 2004) report similar industry and 
geographic concentrations, while others (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Bradley and Jordan, 2002; Lee and 
Wahal, 2004) highlight differences in characteristics of VC- and non-VC-backed IPOs. As already 
discussed, this is consistent with the belief that VCs tend to specialize both by sector and geographic area. 
We employ a methodology that accounts for endogenous choice in matching, allowing causal 
inference in non-experimental settings. We define 𝑦1 as a one-year measure of financial distress risk for 
an IPO firm with VC backing, 𝑦0 as a one-year measure of financial distress risk for the same IPO firm 
without VC backing, and define VC as a dummy variable set equal to 1 for VC-backed IPO firms and 
zero otherwise. Our interest is focused on the difference 𝑦1 − 𝑦0, but this result is unobservable for a 
single firm because a firm either receives VC backing or does not. Therefore, the most important 
information comes from estimating the average VC effect at a full-sample level. In formal terms, we are 
interested in 𝐸(𝑦1 − 𝑦0|𝑉𝐶 = 1, 𝑋), which is equal to: 
𝐸(𝑦1 − 𝑦0|𝑉𝐶 = 1, 𝑋) =  𝐸(𝑦1|𝑉𝐶 = 1, 𝑋) −  𝐸(𝑦0|𝑉𝐶 = 1, 𝑋)                                               (1) 
where X is a set of variables that represent firm and industry characteristics. Unfortunately, as previously 
mentioned, VCs tend to specialize both by sector and industry, so we must control for the screening and 
selection process performed in order to choose the best target firm (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004). 
Consequently, VC investments are not random, and randomization of treatment is unrealizable. So, 
applying this procedure means confronting a bias, formally defined as: 
𝑏(𝑋) =  𝐸(𝑦0|𝑉𝐶 = 1, 𝑋) −  𝐸(𝑦0|𝑉𝐶 = 0,𝑋)                                                                           (2)  
To ameliorate this bias, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propose the propensity score approach. This 
method requires the estimation of a logit model for the endogenous choice variable (VC=1 for VC 
backing, zero otherwise) with a vector of X variables. In other words, the purpose of this matching 
approach is to find a comparable firm that has similar characteristics of a VC-backed IPO firm, but 
differing in that VCs have no equity positions in it.  
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The procedure that we employ is as follows. First, we choose the endogenous dependent variable 
on the propensity score model, the dummy variable VC. Second, we choose the independent variables of 
the model: Age, Total Assets, Industry dummies based on 2- digit SIC code, and firms’ headquarters-state 
dummies. Third, we run a logit regression, based on the accounting data in the year of the IPO, to 
calculate the firm’s propensity score. As a result, we obtain 1,593 propensity scores: one for each firm. 
Finally, after imposing a strict radius equal to ±0.01 propensity score unit and by applying the “radius 
matching” criterion (Becker and Ichino, 2002), for each VC-backed firm we choose the matching firm 
which falls within the radius just described, utilizing the procedure without replacement (Heckman, 
Ichimura, and Todd, 1997). This methodology permits us to match each VC-backed IPO with one or more 
non-VC-backed IPO(s). However, in our case, we never find more than one matching firm for each VC-
backed IPO. This leads to a state that in our case, the “radius matching” is exactly equivalent to the 
“nearest-neighbor matching” methodology. In addition, we check whether the matching procedure is able 
to balance the distribution of the relevant variables in both the control and VC group (balancing 
property).
7
  Formally, the matching criterion can be written as follows: 
 
𝐶 = {𝑝𝑗|    ‖𝑝𝑖 − 𝑝𝑗‖ ≤ 𝑟}⏟           
𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑠 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔
 =⏞
𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒
     min𝑗‖𝑝𝑖 − 𝑝𝑗‖⏟        
𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔
                                                  (3) 
where C is the control firm; i is VC-backed IPO firm; j is non-VC-backed IPO firm; and r is the radius. 
Consequently, we obtain a sample composed of 316 VC- matched with 316 non-VC-backed IPO firms. 
This strict selection criterion leads us to exclude 122 companies (438 minus 316) because no comparable 
match is found. In other words, no one comparable falls in the range imposed by us. 
                                                          
7
 Becker and Ichino (2002, p. 359): “[…] Lemma 1. Balancing of pretreatment variables given the propensity score. 
If 𝑝(𝑋) is the propensity score, then 𝐷 ⊥ 𝑋 | 𝑝 (𝑋). (D in our case is equal to VC). Lemma 2. Unconfoundedness 
given the propensity score. Suppose that assignment to treatment is unconfounded; 𝑦1, 𝑦0 ⊥ 𝐷 | 𝑋. Then assignment 
to treatment is not confounded given the propensity score, 𝑦1, 𝑦0 ⊥ 𝐷 | 𝑝(𝑋). If the Balancing Hypothesis of Lemma 
1 is satisfied, observations with the same propensity score must have the same distribution of observable (and 
unobservable) characteristics independently of treatment status. In other words, for a given propensity score, 
exposure to treatment is random and therefore treated and control units should be on average observationally 
identical. Any standard probability model can be used to estimate the propensity score. […]”. 
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In addition, as a further control, we employ a matching process with replacement that is based on 
a kernel estimator that uses a distribution to specify weights. Specifically, we use a Gaussian Kernel 
distribution where each VC-backed IPO is matched with one or more non-VC-backed IPOs, with the 
propensity score approach calculating the difference between the financial distress risk measures of a VC-
backed IPO and the matched non-VC backed IPO(s). We use bootstrapped standard errors to conduct 
statistical inference. The bootstrapping is based on 50 replications. We also calculate selection-bias-
adjusted 95% confidence intervals. The results are shown in Table 3. 
***Insert Table 3 about here*** 
 
3.  Empirical methodology  
3.1.       Financial Distress Risk Measures        
 Aside from the Equity Ratio variable, all the financial distress risk measures used in this study are 
the result of a maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE)
8
 of a conditional logit model, as used in the 
Zmijewski (1984) and Ohlson (1980) models, and multiple discriminant analysis (MDA)
9
, as used by 
Altman, Hartzell and Peck (1995).
10
 Two reasons motivate the use of these models. The first is simplicity 
                                                          
8
 Assume that 𝑋𝑛 is a vector of predictors for the n-th observation; assume that δ is a set of unknown parameters and 
assume that P(𝑋𝑛;  𝛿) is the probability of bankruptcy corresponding to given values of 𝑋𝑖 and δ. The log-likelihood 
function of any specific outcomes is given by: 
𝑙(𝛿) = ∑(𝑃)𝑙𝑛[𝑋𝑛; 𝛿]
𝑛
+∑(1 − 𝑃)
𝑛
𝑙𝑛[1 − 𝑋𝑛; 𝛿] 
now, the assessment parameters are estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function, i.e. by solving max𝛿 𝑙(𝛿). 
9
 Discriminant analysis is used to classify cases into one or more groups of populations on the basis of a set variables 
measured on each case. The populations are known by the scholar to be distinct and to which each individual 
belongs.  The discriminant function is the linear combination of the independent variables that will best discriminate 
between the a priori identified groups. Discrimination is achieved by finding the linear combination that maximizes 
the differences between the groups. With n observations and p independent variables, 1 < i < p and 1 < k < m, the 
discriminant function, can be written as follows: 
𝑍 = 𝛼 + 𝑣1𝑋1𝑘 + 𝑣2𝑋2𝑘 + …+ 𝑣𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑘 
where Z’’ is the discriminant Z’’-score calculated using the j-th discriminant function on the k-th observation; α is 
the intercept, vi  is the discriminant weight for independent variable i, and Xij is the i-th independent variable 
measured on the k-th observation. In general, this technique is most used for more-than-two groups. Vice versa, 
logistic regression is most common when there are only two groups. 
10
 We use Z” -score that was introduced for both non-manufacturing and manufacturing sectors. The variables of the 
Z”- score are similar of those of Z-score model with the exclusion of the sales/total assets in order to filter the 
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of computation, since all three measures primarily use accounting data that are easily retrieved from 
COMPUSTAT. Second, as argued by Zmijewski (1984, p.59), studies “typically estimate financial 
distress prediction models on nonrandom samples. Estimating models on such samples can result in 
biased parameter and probability estimates if appropriate estimation techniques are not used.”11 Thus we 
use the Zmijewski model, which is calibrated to a random sample in order to deal with these phenomena. 
In sum, we use four financial distress risk measures that can be described as follows. The Z’’-score model 
(Altman, Hartzell and Peck, 1995) is estimated as: 
𝑍′′ − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 6.56 (
𝑊𝐶
𝑇𝐴
)⏟  
𝑋1
+ 3.26 (
RE
𝑇𝐴
)⏟
𝑋2
+ 6.72 (
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑇𝐴
)⏟  
𝑋3
+ 1.05 (
𝐵𝑉
𝑇𝐿
)⏟
𝑋4
                                           (4) 
with WC being working capital; TA total assets; RE retained earnings; EBIT earnings before interest and 
taxes; MC market capitalization; TL total liabilities; and TR total revenue. The five sub-ratios that form 
this score reflect X1, a measure of the net liquid assets of the firm relative to total capitalization. Working 
capital is defined as the difference between current assets and current liabilities. X2 is the measure of 
cumulative profitability over time. It provides an estimate of how close companies are to default, with 
high values being far away from default and low values indicating danger. This measure implicitly takes 
into account the age of the firm, since older firms probably show a higher value of this ratio. X3 is 
operating efficiency, apart from tax and leveraging factors. Altman (1968) states that “this ratio appears 
to be particularly appropriate for studies dealing with corporate failure. Insolvency in a bankruptcy sense 
occurs when the total liabilities exceed a fair valuation of the firm’s assets with value determined by the 
earning power of the assets.” Finally, X4 measures when book value of total equity, BV, tends to approach 
or become smaller than total debt, after which the firm becomes insolvent and eventually bankrupt. As 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
function from the possible distortion related to the sector. For this reason, we use Z’’-score rather than Z-score that 
is solely limited to manufacturing corporations. However, as robustness check, we perform all the elaborations also 
on Z-score. The results are qualitatively the same. 
11
 In other words, Zmijewski states that previous studies are affected by at least two kinds of biases. The first bias 
results from oversampling distressed firms compared to non-distressed firms, having, in this way, a final sample 
poorly matched with reality (choice-based sample biases). The second bias results from using a complete data 
sample selection criterion, where the data for distressed firms are notoriously incomplete (sample selection biases). 
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noted, a higher value of the Z”-score indicates a lower financial distress risk.12 The ZM-score model 
(Zmijewski, 1984) is estimated as: 
𝑍𝑀 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =  −4.336 − 4.513(
𝑁𝐼
𝑇𝐴
) + 5.679(
𝑇𝐿
𝑇𝐴
) + 0.004(
𝐶𝐴
𝐶𝐿
)                                            (5) 
where NI is net income; TA total assets; TL total liabilities; CA current assets; and CL current liabilities. A 
higher Zmijewski-score value indicates higher financial distress risk. The O-score model (Ohlson, 1980) 
is estimated as: 
𝑂 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =  −1.32 − 0.407 log(𝑇𝐴) + 6.03 (
𝑇𝐿
𝑇𝐴
) − 1.43 (
𝑊𝐶
𝑇𝐴
) + 0.076(
𝐶𝐿
𝐶𝐴
) − 1.72 𝐷𝑇𝐿−𝑇𝐴 −
2.37 (
𝑁𝐼
𝑇𝐴
) − 1.83 (
𝐹𝐹𝑂
𝑇𝐿
) + 0.285 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 − 0.521(
𝑁𝐼𝑡−𝑁𝐼𝑡−1
|𝑁𝐼𝑡|+|𝑁𝐼𝑡−1|
)                                       (6) 
where TA is total assets; TL total liabilities; WC working capital; CL current liabilities; CA current assets; 
𝐷𝑇𝐿−𝑇𝐴 is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if total liabilities are higher than total assets, and 0 
otherwise; NI is net income; FFO funds from operations; and 𝐷𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 is a dummy variable taking a value of 
1 if the company realized a net loss in the last two years, zero otherwise. A higher O-score value is 
associated with a higher financial distress risk. The Equity ratio is estimated simply as: 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐵𝑉
𝑇𝐴
                                                                                                                         (7) 
This is equivalent to Leverage
-1
 and is simply the book value of total equity (BV) normalized by total 
assets (TA). As argued by Andrade and Kaplan (1998), a high level of leverage is one of the primary 
causes of financial distress. The Equity ratio completes our measures of financial distress risk measures. 
A higher value of the Equity ratio indicates lower financial distress risk. 
***Insert Table 4 about here*** 
3.2.    Specification models 
In order to correctly evaluate the impact of VC financing on a company’s financial distress risk, 
we base the multivariate analysis on two steps that differ depending on the sample composition. 
Specifically, we first run OLS on the panel data for estimating the Model 1 which is specified as follows: 
                                                          
12
 Altman, Hartzell and Peck define the following zones of discrimination: Z’’ > 2.6 safe zone; 1.1< Z’’ < 2.6 gray 
zone; and Z’’ < 1.1, distress zone. 
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Model 1                                            𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐶𝑖 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                   (8) 
where i denotes a firm ( i = 1, 2, …, 1,593). In our first round of the analysis, we consider the full sample 
as an experimental setting (1,593 IPOs) composed of 438 VC-backed IPOs and 1,155 non-VC-backed 
IPOs as reported in the data and sample section. Here t denotes the time dimension represented by the five 
fiscal years after the listing year (t = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5); y denotes the financial distress risk measures (Z”-
score, ZM-score, O-score, Equity ratio); VC is a dummy variable which is set to 1 for VC backed IPOs 
firms and 0 otherwise; X is a vector of control variables; and ε is the random error term. Second, we 
attempt to deal with the endogeneity concerns that affect our initial sample (see section 2.2), by 
estimating model 1 using a subsample composed of 316 VC-backed IPOs matched with 316 non-VC-
backed IPOs, as described in section 2.3. Variable definitions are reported in the appendix as Table A1. 
 
4.  Econometric results 
4.1.       Impact of VC backing on IPO firm financial distress risk 
Table 5 presents the results of estimating the impact of VC backing on the risk of financial 
distress on IPO firms by using the OLS regression model. The dependent variables are Z”-score (columns 
I and II), Equity ratio (columns III and IV), ZM-score (columns V and VI) and O-score (columns VII and 
VIII), respectively. As noted, high values of Z”-score and Equity Ratio are associated with a low risk of 
financial distress, whereas high values of ZM-score and O-score are associated with a high risk of 
financial distress. Columns I, III, V and VII report the results of estimating model 1, where a company’s 
financial distress risk is a function of a dummy variable for VC-backed IPOs, various other firm-specific 
characteristics, and macroeconomic-specific variation. Columns II, IV, VI and VIII report estimations 
obtained by adding to the baseline regression specification the Industry, State and Year dummy variables.  
***Insert Table 5 about here*** 
We find that several factors are statistically signiﬁcant drivers of the risk of financial distress for 
IPO firms. Specifically, financial distress measures are negatively inﬂuenced (at the 5% conﬁdence level 
or less) by firm size and the growth rate of GDP, and positively influenced (at the 5% conﬁdence level or 
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less, except for O-score) by firm age. Unsurprisingly, the set of dummy variables describing industrial 
sectors, territorial differences and time periods contribute significantly to explaining IPO firms’ risk of 
financial distress. In contrast, the coefficient of Capex is almost never significant. 
Regarding the impact of VC backing on the risk of financial distress of IPO firms, we find, in line 
with the univariate analysis, that VC-backed IPO firms exhibit significantly lower risk of financial 
distress than do non-VC backed IPOs (at the 1% confidence level or less). In terms of Z”-score and 
Equity ratio, the coefficient of VC variable is positive (in columns II and IV: 2.537 and 0.086, 
respectively) and highly significant (in columns II and IV: 2.59 and 3.60, respectively). In terms of ZM-
score and O-score, the coefficient of the VC variable is negative (in columns VI and VIII: -0.719 and -
0.744, respectively) and significant (in columns VI and VIII: -3.35 and -3.14, respectively). As such, our 
earlier empirical results are consistent with both the screening hypothesis and the treatment effect 
hypothesis (financial effect plus value-added effect).  
Having documented that VC-backed IPO firms display a lower risk of financial distress than do 
other IPOs, the second step of our analysis aims to satisfy the need to determine whether this result comes 
from the VCs’ screening role or the treatment effect (or from both). Following previous researchers (Lee 
and Wahal, 2004; Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy, 2011; Croce, D’Adda, and Ughetto, 2015), we 
implement the propensity score matching-based analysis to properly evaluate the treatment effect in OLS 
estimation, net of the screening, since this method allows us to control for observed heterogeneity among 
treated (VC-backed) and untreated (non-VC-backed) firms, represented by the characteristics included in 
the matching process. As highlighted in section 2.3, a matching estimator contributes to solving the 
selection bias problem by picking, for each VC-backed firm that receives VC financing in year t, the non-
VC-backed firm that in the same year t has the most similar probability (the closest propensity score) of 
receiving VC. Table 6 presents the results of the propensity score matching-based analysis.  
***Insert Table 6 about here*** 
For each dependent variable of interest, we again estimate two OLS specifications, one with 
(columns II, IV, VI and VIII) and another without (columns I, III, V and VII) Industry, State and Year 
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dummy variables. For the first time, the coefficient of VC variable in the Z”-score and Equity ratio 
regressions are highly significantly positive, whereas in terms of ZM-score and O-score the coefficients 
of VC are significantly negative. Thus, VC variable coefficients retain significance after controlling for 
observed heterogeneity among VC-backed firms and non VC-backed firms. In terms of economic 
significance, the regression analysis indicates that VC financing increases Z’’-score of 2.414 units 
(column I). The economic significance is higher, at 4.763 Z’’-score units, when we add State, Industry 
and Year dummy variables. The Equity ratio results suggest that VC financing increases its value of 
11.1% (column III). As Z’’-score case, the economic significance is higher, at 14.3% (column IV), when 
we add State, Industry and Year dummy variables. Consistently, VC financing reduces the bankruptcy 
probabilities of 86.6% (column V) and of 76.8% (column VII) for ZM-score and O-score, respectively. 
Once again, the economic significance is higher, at 121.2% (column VI) and 119.6% (column VIII) for 
ZM-score and O-score, respectively, when we add State, Industry and Year dummy variables.  
Results discussed here suggest that the lower risk of financial distress of VC-backed IPO firms 
depends not only on the VCs’ screening ability but also on the financial and non-financial services they 
provide to the backed firms. As observed by Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy (2011), one possible 
limitation of the propensity score matching analysis is that it does not control for the effect of unobserved 
factors (such as a brilliant business idea) on the selection of firms that get VC financing. As such, in 
section 4.4 we perform robustness checks to further confirm our results about the impact of VC backing 
on the risk of financial distress of IPOs. 
4.2.       The risk of financial distress and the cost of debt 
A question raised by the results of the previous section is whether or not the lower financial 
distress risks by VC-backed IPOs results in a lower cost of debt. In this section, we attempt to provide an 
answer by conducting a test on the sample chosen through propensity score approach. Table 7 reports 
medians of the Interest Ratio (total interest paid on total debt) both for VC-backed IPOs sample and for 
the respective control IPO firms. The analysis is conducted by distinguishing between the best and the 
worst firms. Specifically, concerning Z’’-score, firms are grouped into three ranges on the basis of the 
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three zones of discrimination identified by Altman, Hartzell and Peck (1995). This is, firms that show a  
Z’’-score less than 1.1 are grouped in the Distress Zone; between 1.1 and 2.6 in the Grey Zone; over  2.6 
in the Safe Zone, that are defined as best firms. Since ZM-score and O-score are the result of a maximum-
likelihood estimation of a conditional logit model and Equity ratio is simply a ratio between two 
variables, there have not been identified, for these three variables, discriminant zones as in the case of Z’’-
score. Considering that they are continuous variables, we overcome this issue by defining as Best Firms 
those that show a ZM-score and O-score among the first quartile of the respective distribution; and as 
Worst Firms those that show a ZM-score and O-score among the fourth quartile. Conversely, given that 
Equity ratio works in an opposite way--a higher value indicates a lower financial distress risk--we define 
as Worst Firms those that show an Equity ratio among the first quartile of the respective distribution; and 
as Best Firms those that show an Equity ratio among the fourth quartile. The results seem to suggest that 
as the financial risk increases, the cost of debt increases as well.  
**** Insert Table 7 about here **** 
The results are resilient to all the financial distress risk measures used. In particular, on the side of 
Z’’-score, Interest Ratio is equal to 4.99% and 6.09% (significantly different at 10% level) along Distress 
Zone for VC- and non-VC-backed IPOs, respectively. As we move to Safe Zone, these values drop to 
3.23% and 4.46% (significantly different at 1% level) for VC- and non-VC-backed IPOs, respectively. 
Similarly, Interest Ratio is equal to 5.31% and 6.02% (significantly different at 10% level) for Worst 
Firms, and 2.13% and 3.79% (significantly different at 1% level), for Best Firms for VC- and non-VC-
backed IPOs, respectively, both based on ZM-score. For O-score, Interest Ratio is equal to 5.67% and 
6.20% for Worst Firms, and 2.29% and 3.58% (significantly different at 1% level), for Best Firms, for 
VC- and non-VC-backed IPOs, respectively. We can thus conclude that after controlling for the level of 
financial distress risk, VC-backed IPOs always show lower Interest Ratios than do firms that are not. This 
phenomenon seems to be consistent with the certification hypothesis by Megginson and Weiss (1991). 
4.3.      Distinguishing between bank affiliated and independent VCs 
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In this section we evaluating the impact of the different types of VCs. Specifically, we split the 
VC-backed IPOs sample in two: firms backed by bank affiliated VCs and firms backed by independent 
VCs. In a case where a company going public is backed by VC syndication, we focus on the lead VC, the 
VC with the highest equity stake in an IPO company as of the listing date (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu, 
2007). Once the lead VC is identified from IPO PROSPECTUSES, we gather the information about its 
nature from THOMSONE ONE. Hence, we build two dummy variables to distinguish between different 
VCs. Specifically, we set Bank VC to 1 when firms are backed by a bank affiliated VC and to zero 
otherwise. Conversely, we set Independent VC to 1 when firms are backed by independent VC and to zero 
otherwise. To account for selection bias issues discussed previously, we conduct the testing using the 
sample generated by the propensity score matching approach.
13
  
Table 8 presents the results of estimating the impact of VC type on the risk of financial distress of 
IPO firms using the baseline models of the previous section. Specifically, Columns I, III, V and VII report 
the results of estimating the impact of being financed by bank affiliated VC on the risk of financial 
distress for IPO firms and various other firm-specific characteristics, and macroeconomic-specific 
variation. Conversely, Columns II, IV, VI and VIII refer to the same estimations but the aim is to capture 
the impact of being financed by an independent VC.   
***Insert Table 8 about here*** 
Overall, the findings seem to confirm that VC-backed IPOs experience lower risk of financial 
distress than do non-VC backed IPOs, and this is the case both when firms are backed by bank affiliated 
VCs and by independent VCs. In terms of Z”-score and Equity ratio, the coefficient of Bank VC variable 
is positive (in columns I and III: 5.849 and 0.166, respectively) and highly significant (in columns I and 
III: 2.03 and 2.47, respectively). In terms of ZM-score and O-score, the coefficient of Bank VC variable is 
negative (in columns V and VII: -1.565 and -1.015, respectively) and significant, limited to ZM-score (in 
columns V and VII: -2.36 and -1.56, respectively). Equivalently, in terms of Z”-score and Equity ratio, 
                                                          
13
 For 37 VC backed IPOs, we are not able to retrieve information regarding VC type since this is listed as 
“Unknown” in THOMSON ONE. We exclude these firms from the analysis. 
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the coefficient of Independent VC variable is positive (in columns II and IV: 3.473 and 0.098, 
respectively) and highly significant (in columns II and IV: 2.63 and 3.12, respectively). In terms of ZM-
score and O-score, the coefficient of Independent VC variable is negative (in columns VI and VIII: -0.790 
and -0.961, respectively) and significant (in columns VI and VIII: -2.61 and -3.15, respectively). As noted, 
the coefficients of Bank VC are higher compared to Independent VC, regarding the Z”-score and Equity 
ratio variables. The coefficients of Bank VC are lower compared to Independent VC, regarding ZM-score 
and O-score variables. At this stage, it is worth briefly discussing the economic significance of these 
figures. The Z”-score outcomes clearly suggest that, for VC-backed IPOs, being supported by bank 
affiliated VCs produces a Z”-score of 5.849 units versus only a 3.473 score when supported by 
independent VCs. Since a higher value of Z”-score indicates a lower financial distress risk, this suggests 
that bank affiliated VCs desire a lower level of financial distress risk more than do independent VCs. 
As shown by Hellman, Lindsey and Puri (2008), bank affiliated VCs target their investments in a 
manner that yields synergy with the bank’s core business.  As such, they would be interested in engaging 
in a long-term relationship after the VC financing. Under these conditions, the hypothesis makes sense 
that bank affiliated VCs tend to prefer lower risk investee firms. In particular, Hellman, Lindsey and Puri 
(2008, p.514) find that “building a relationship at the early venture capital stage increases a bank’s 
likelihood of providing a loan to the company at a later stage. [...] having made a venture capital 
investment significantly increases a bank’s chances of financing that company in the loan market. […] 
companies may benefit from this relationship through lower loan pricing”. 
4.4.      Robustness check 
This section presents the main results of two additional robustness checks that further investigate 
whether VC financing causally impacts the financial risk of VC-backed IPOs. First, we estimate OLS 
with one lagged value of the dependent variable to account for the possibility that our empirical models of 
IPO firms’ financial distress risk suffer from specification bias due to unobserved heterogeneity. In 
unreported results, we find that the effects of VC backing on the risk of financial distress remain 
substantially unchanged.  
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Second, we restrict the analysis to VC-backed firms and specify a linear model to verify whether 
the firm’s financial distress varies across IPO firms according to the effectiveness of VC investments. 
Indeed, if the VC treatment effect hypothesis is true, we would expect that VC-backed firms characterized 
by higher VC investment intensity should exhibit lower risk of financial distress. Following various 
papers (Jain and Kini, 1995; Wang, Wang and Lu, 2003; Tian, 2012), we measure the intensity of a VC 
investment through two indicators: (a) the length of time between the induction of the first VC to the 
board of directors and the IPO (LI), and (b) the VC syndication dummy (Syndication)
14
, which is a 
variable assuming the value of 1 for firms in which pre-IPO shareholding were two or more VC investors. 
The idea behind the use of LI is that the longer the investment period, the greater the 
opportunities VCs have to add value to portfolio firms and influence their actions. Furthermore, we use 
Syndication because when VC investors form a syndicate to co-invest in a project, syndicate members 
who have heterogeneous skills, information, industry expertise, and networks can provide a broad range 
of inputs for entrepreneurial firms (Tian, 2012). Overall, our results, that are omitted here for sake of 
brevity, confirm the idea that the greater the VC investments intensity, the lower the risk that an IPO firm 
will encounter financial distress, again suggesting a negative causal relationship between VC financing 
and the risk of financial distress for firms receiving such financing. 
 
5.      The impact of VC’s reputation on firm’s financial distress risk 
We next analyze the role of VC reputation in explaining post-IPO risk of financial distress. This 
issue is of special interest because previous studies (e.g., Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh, 2011) 
indicate that all VC firms are not equal: companies backed by more reputable VCs exhibit superior post-
IPO operative performance compared to those backed by less reputable VCs. This result has a twofold 
explanation. First, VCs with a high reputation have a greater ability to select better-quality portfolio firms 
and provide them with more valuable advisory and monitoring services. Secondly, less reputable VCs can 
                                                          
14
 The data are hand collected from IPO prospectuses (for the year of the offering), retrieved from the filing section 
of THOMSON ONE. We set the dummy variable Syndication on 1 if at the time of offering there are more than one 
VC with equity position in the target firm, and 0 otherwise. 
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have strong incentives to “grandstand” by taking weak firms public too early (see Gompers, 1996; Lee 
and Wahal, 2004). As such, it appears imperative not only to observe how these companies perform after 
the IPO, but also determine their level of financial distress risk. 
5.1        VC Reputation Measure 
Taking inspiration from other studies that have investigated the impact of VC’s reputation on 
portfolio firms (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Nahata, 2008; Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy, 2011; 
Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh, 2011), we measure VC’s reputation using the market share of the 
amount of funds raised by the VC over the prior five-year rolling window.
15
 Specifically, we first 
calculate the cumulative funds raised for each VC firm in the five years prior to the listing of the 
corresponding backed firm, retrieving the data from THOMSON ONE. Second, we calculate the market 
share for each VC firm by dividing its cumulative funds raised by the total cumulative amount of funds 
raised. Finally, we construct a dummy variable, VC Reputation, which takes value 1 if the VC firm, for 
the corresponding time window, is among the top 50 VC firms for market share and zero otherwise. We 
define VC firms among the top 50 as High Reputation firms and the others as Low Reputation firms.  
In a case where a company going public is backed by a VC syndication, we focus on the lead 
VC’s reputation--the reputation of the VC with highest equity stake in the IPO company as of the listing 
date (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu, 2007).
16
 However, our approach differs slightly from previous 
studies (Nahata, 2008; Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy, 2011; Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh, 
2011) that use the median value to classify VCs into high and low reputation classes. Our choice is 
motivated by the fact that VC fund-raising is highly concentrated among a few VC firms. This is clearly 
seen by observing the list of Top 100 VCs published annually by Entrepreneur magazine, where huge 
spread in terms of market share are observed between the first and hundredth VC firm. Consistently, we 
find that VC funds raised are highly concentrated among the top 50 VC firms in THOMSON ONE data. 
                                                          
15
 As empirically shown by Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Vissing-Jørgensen (2014), the VCs’ track record affect their 
capability to raise new funds. The explanation of this result arises by considering that limited partners (LPs) increase 
their appetite, propensity, to entrust new funds to general partners (GPs) on the basis of past success of these latter. 
16
 The information apt to identify the lead VC investor and its stake is retrieved from IPO PROSPECTUSES.  
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For example, in 2000 the cumulative value of funds raised in the five previous years by the first hundred 
VC firms is about 50% of the total funds raised by the entire VC industry, composed of about 3,000 VC 
firms. This statistic remains substantially unchanged over time. Therefore, in the presence of such a 
concentrated industry, the use of median value as the parameter of discrimination between high and low 
reputable VC firms seems inappropriate.
17
 As the role of VC reputation in explaining post-IPO risk of 
financial distress can also depend on how large an equity stake the VC firm has in the IPO company at the 
listing date, we construct the variable VC Reputation_x_Stake, which is the product of VC Reputation-FR 
and lead VC’s Stake of equity in the portfolio firm as of the listing date.  
5.2       Differences in outcomes among VC-backed firms: High and Low reputation VCs 
In this section, we investigate the differences in the financial distress risk measures between firms 
backed by high and low reputation VCs. Specifically, our investigation process proceeds as follows. First, 
we verify the quality of our VC’s reputation variable. We do so by analyzing the impact of VC reputation 
on firm financial performance. As suggested by Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh (2011, p. 1327), 
“more reputable VCs continue to have significant positive associations with a number of post-IPO long-
run performance measures”. The authors interpret this evidence “as indicating that continued post-IPO 
support and development of portfolio firms by more reputable VCs positively affects their long-term 
performance”. Using two well-known measures of financial performance – ROA (Return on Assets) and 
EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization) on Assets – we test the above 
proposition using our dataset. Panel A of Table 9 presents, among other results, the median value and 
Wilcoxon test for ROA and EBITDA/Assets for firms backed by high- and low-reputable VCs by 
considering the entire time window from IPO data to five fiscal years later. As shown, we find that the 
performance of firms backed by highly reputable VCs are significantly higher compared to those backed 
by low reputation VCs, with the difference being on average around 6% and 8%, respectively.
18
 These 
                                                          
17
 For example, Chemmanur, Krishnan and Nandy (2011) define VCs with a market share of funds raised being 
above the sample median as highly reputable and low reputation VCs as those below the sample median. 
18
 In unreported tests, we also run the regressions by considering as dependent variable both ROA and Ebitda/Assets. 
Consistent with expectations, we find that being backed by a highly reputable VC is strongly positive for a firm’s 
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results are not novel (Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh, 2011) and, as such, should not need further 
interpretation. We refer to them merely as a test of the correctness of our VC reputation measure.  
**** Insert Table 9 about here **** 
We next focus on the role of VC reputation in explaining post-IPO risk of financial distress. 
Panels A and B of Table 9 presents the median value and Wilcoxon test for the four measures of financial 
distress risk used in this study for firms backed by high and low reputation VCs by considering the entire 
time window from IPO date to five fiscal years later. As shown, we find that firms backed by highly 
reputable VCs experience a higher level of financial distress risk than do firms backed by low reputation 
VCs. This result is supported by the difference of median values being significantly different from zero, at 
the 1% level, for three of four financial distress risk measures. 
Table 10 reports OLS estimations for each dependent variable of interest. In line with univariate 
analyses, we find that VC reputation negatively affects the financial distress risk of VC backed firms. 
Specifically, VC Reputation and VC Reputation_x_Stake display a negative correlation with the Z”-score 
and Equity ratio (at the 1% conﬁdence level) and a positive correlation with ZM-score and O-score (at the 
5% conﬁdence level or less).19 Focusing on Z”-score outcomes suggests that being supported by high 
reputable VCs decreases Z”-score of 2.336 units. Since higher values of Z”-score indicate lower financial 
distress risk, this implies that lower VC reputation is associated with lower financial distress risk. 
***Insert Table 10 about here*** 
5.3     VC screening and VC impact on investee firms: Disentangling the effects 
The coefficient estimates in Table 10 may be affected by selection bias arising out of the likely 
matching of better portfolio companies with more reputable VC firms. As a result, the risk of financial 
distress of VC-backed firms may be attributable to their characteristics rather than VCs’ reputation effect. 
In order to control for this kind of endogeneity, we use Heckman’s (1979) correction procedure. In a 1st 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
operating performance. Specifically, we run the regressions once with dummy variable VC Reputationand and once 
with variable VC Reputation_x_Stake, and the coefficients are always significantly different fro zero at 1% level. 
19
 As a robustness check we also measure VC reputation using a dummy that takes value 1 if the VC firm, for the 
corresponding time window, is among the top 100 VC firms for market share and zero otherwise. The results, that 
are not reported for brevity, are substantially unchanged. 
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step, a probit regression is estimated for the likelihood of a firm receiving funding from a more reputable 
VC. Specifically, VC Reputation represents the dependent variable. The instrumental variables (IVs) are 
VC Firm Experience and Nearby Firm. The reasons for inclusion of explanatory variables in the selection 
equation are as follows. We use VC Firm Experience, measured by the natural logarithm of the age of 
each VC firm, because reputation is at least partially based on experience (Nahata, 2008). We find that 
VC Firm Experience is significantly related to VC reputation, but is unrelated to issuer financial distress 
risk-measure. Nearby Firm is an indicator for an IPO firm whose headquarters is located in the same state 
as that of its lead VC firm. As highlighted by Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh (2011), VCs have 
strong incentives to limit general partners’ time commitment to an investee firm by reducing partner 
travel time. More reputable VCs should have greater ability to select VC investments located nearby and 
to require more distant portfolio firms to move nearby. While VC Firm Experience is significantly related 
to VC reputation, it is unrelated to issuer financial distress risk measures. The first step concludes by 
estimating the Inverse Mills ratio that is included in the following 2-step regression model: 
y = β0 + β1 Market Share VC Firm + β2Age + β3Size + β4Capex + β5GDP+ ΣβiState Dummies + 
ΣβjIndustry Dummies + β6Inverse Mills + ε, 
where y is the financial distress risk measure, and the Market Share VC Firm is the market share of the 
VC firm for funds raised five year prior to the listing of the corresponding backed firm. This is the 
endogenous covariate. The Inverse Mills ratio captures the likelihood that highly reputable VCs are more 
likely to select better quality portfolio firms compared to low reputation ones. 
Table 11 presents 2-step Heckman (1979) regression coefficients. As is standard, all control 
variables in the second step equation are also included in the first step. According to our arguments the 
IVs are positively and significantly related to VC Reputation. The explanatory power of the first-stage 
models is sufficiently high, as the Adjusted R squared value is 27.52%. Since Market Share VC Firm 
continues to have significant negative associations with Z”-score and Equity ratio and significant positive 
association with ZM-score and O-Score, we conclude that the higher financial distress risk exhibited by 
companies backed by more reputable VCs is due to how these investors perform their monitoring role. 
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The second step regressions also indicate VC selectivity does not matter, since the Inverse Mills ratio is 
statistically insignificant for all of the issuer financial distress risk measures.  
***Insert Table 11 about here*** 
5.4       Why are more reputable VCs associated with higher risk of financial distress? 
Taken as a whole, the results discussed above are somewhat unexpected, because previous studies 
shed light on the benefits deriving from highly reputable VC investments. As such, we consider it 
appropriate to delve deeper into this issue by investigating the impact of VC reputation on the 
determinants of financial distress risk indicator.
20
 Thus, we re-estimate the regression model in Table 10, 
after replacing the dependent variable with the components of Z”-score, one by one. As reported in Table 
12, we find that VC Reputation is: (i) negatively correlated with the working capital on total assets ratio 
(at the 1% confidence level); (ii) negatively related with the retained earnings on total assets ratio (at the 
10% confidence level); (iii) positively related with the EBIT on total assets ratio (at the 10% confidence 
level or less); (iv) negatively related to capital ratio (at 1% confidence level).  
***Insert Table 12 about here*** 
In summary, according to Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh (2011), we find that companies 
backed by more reputable VC-backed firms perform better than others, but we also document that this 
success comes, at least partially, from more aggressive investment (lower proportion of current assets on 
total assets) and financing policy (lower capital ratio). Indeed, the greater the investments in long-term 
assets and the use of debt financing, the higher the operating performance and shareholders’ profitably, 
but also the higher the risk of financial distress. As such, while our additional evidence seems to be 
consistent with the certification theory (Megginson and Weiss, 1991), which predict that companies 
backed by more reputable VCs are more likely to obtain external financing, such as bank debt financing.
21
 
 
                                                          
20
 We warmly thank Edward Altman for this precious suggestion. 
21
 Leaving unchanged the criteria discussed along the paragraph 5, we construct an addition measure of VC’ 
reputation based on the assets under management (AUM) and replicate all the analysis presented. The results are 
qualitatively the same. We do not present them here for brevity reasons but they are available upon request. 
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6.   Conclusions  
Our paper analyzes the effects of VC investments on the risk of financial distress of portfolio 
firms. Using a sample of 1,593 US IPOs between 1990 and 2007, we examine whether VC-backed IPO 
firms are less financially distressed after going public than others and whether the risk of financial distress 
varies across investee firms according to reputation and type of VC firms. We present several results.  
First, after controlling for other determinants of a firm’s risk of financial distress such as size and 
age, we find VC backed IPOs exhibit a lower risk of financial distress than do non-VC backed IPOs. This 
result, which can be consistent with either the screening hypothesis or the treatment hypothesis, or both, is 
robust to all the financial distress measures used (Z”-score; ZM-score; O-score; and Equity ratio). 
Second, we disentangle the screening and treatment effects of VC backing by using propensity score 
matching, and find that the lower risk of financial distress of VC-backed IPO firms depends both on how 
VC investors select their investments (screening ability), and on the business support (financial and non-
financial) they provide to a portfolio firm. This result is robust to checks for possible limitations of the 
propensity score matching analysis. Third, we find that as the financial risk decreases the cost of debt 
decreases as well, though VC-backed IPOs always show a lower cost of debt compared to others. Fourth, 
we find that companies backed by more reputable VCs exhibit higher levels of financial distress risk even 
when they show superior operating performance. This result, which is robust to the correction of selection 
bias concerns, appears related to VCs’ capital structure choices (high use of debt) and investment 
selection (illiquid asset choices). Finally, we find that bank affiliated VC-backed IPOs are safer compared 
to independent VC-backed IPOs, consistent with the idea that bank affiliated VCs are interested in a long-
term success of their portfolio firms in attempt to yields synergies with the banking core business. 
Our study contributes to recent policy discussions about the increasing risk of financial markets. 
Policymakers and regulators are afraid that IPOs may produce adverse effects on the financial system as a 
whole by transferring too much risk from entrepreneurs and institutional investors to retail investors. We 
show instead that the VC industry represents an effective tool to mitigate these worries and provides 
valuable support to financial market stability. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics in the IPO calendar year of VC- and non-VC-backed IPOs 
This table shows the summary characteristics of VC- and non-VC-backed firms in the IPO calendar year. Panel A provides means and medians of various 
characteristics of VC- and non-VC-backed IPOs, along with associated Wilcoxon statistics and t-statistics. Total assets, revenue, book value and market value are in 
millions of dollars. Age is the number of years from the founding date to the IPO date. Capex, which is the ratio between the capital expenditures and the total assets, 
is in percent. Panel B, C, D and E provide means and medians of financial distress risk indicators (Z’’-score, Equity ratio, ZM-score and O-score, respectively) for 
VC- and non-VC-backed IPOs. Means and medians are measured considering both the full sample period (1990-2007) and various sub-periods. 
 
 VC- backed IPOs non-VC- backed IPOs T-test 
(P-value) 
Wilcoxon test 
(P-value)  Mean Median N Mean Median N 
Panel A: Characteristics of VC backed and non-VC backed IPOs 
Total Assets 562.86 109.79 438 1,166.51 104.37 1,155 0.0074 0.5755 
Revenue 459.70 60.09 438 863.68 86.33 1,155 0.0154 0.0004 
Age 9.83 7.00 438 19.31 8.00 1,008 0.0000 0.0019 
Capex (%) 5.90 3.70 437 8.70 4.90 1,136 0.0000 0.0000 
Book Value 289.67 78.11 438 512.58 53.23 1,155 0.0359 0.0016 
Market Value 1,323.13 350.65 438 1,307.32 200.46 1,155 0.9543 0.0000 
Panel B: Time series distribution of  Z’’-score 
1990-2007 8.00 6.50 438 5.25 4.11 1,155 0.0000 0.0000 
1990-1993 9.90 7.52 62 5.95 4.94 219 0.0000 0.0000 
1994-1997 8.88 7.93 81 5.87 4.74 410 0.0028 0.0041 
1998-2002 9.43 6.92 124 4.50 3.63 319 0.0054 0.0001 
2003-2007 5.86 5.27 171 4.42 2.70 207 0.0775 0.0002 
Panel C: Time series distribution of  Equity ratio 
1990-2007 0.69 0.77 438 0.57 0.61 1,155 0.0000 0.0000 
1990-1993 0.73 0.77 62 0.57 0.59 219 0.0000 0.0000 
1994-1997 0.70 0.79 81 0.59 0.62 410 0.0006 0.0000 
1998-2002 0.74 0.83 124 0.57 0.64 319 0.0000 0.0000 
2003-2007 0.65 0.71 171 0.51 0.53 207 0.0000 0.0000 
Panel D: Time series distribution of  ZM-score 
1990-2007 -2.27 -2.70 438 -1.62 -2.06 1,155 0.0002 0.0000 
1990-1993 -2.89 -3.04 62 -2.00 -2.29 219 0.0002 0.0001 
1994-1997 -2.37 -2.81 81 -1.97 -2.17 410 0.2743 0.0204 
1998-2002 -2.06 -2.49 124 -1.01 -1.94 319 0.0166 0.0068 
2003-2007 -2.14 -2.62 171 -1.47 -1.55 207 0.0024 0.0004 
Panel E: Time series distribution of  O-score 
1990-2007 -0.97 -1.41 438 0.14 -1.29 1,155 0.3445 0.1009 
1990-1993 -1.83 -2.16 62 -1.16 -1.29 219 0.1174 0.0554 
1994-1997 -0.73 -1.26 81 -0.78 -1.29 410 0.9281 0.7984 
1998-2002 0.64 -0.46 124 2.96 -1.22 319 0.5734 0.0841 
2003-2007 -1.93 -2.08 171 -1.02 -1.35 207 0.0650 0.0153 
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Table 2. Distribution and characteristics of VC- and non-VC-backed IPOs 
This table shows the distribution of VC- and non-VC-backed IPOs by characteristics. Panel A shows the distribution of VC- and non-VC- backed IPOs across two-
digit SIC codes. Panel B shows the geographic distribution of VC- and non-VC- backed IPOs. Panel C shows the time-series distribution of VC- and non-VC- 
backed IPOs in each calendar year. 
 
Panel A Panel B Panel C 
 Overall VC non-VC  Overall VC non-VC  Overall VC non-VC 
SIC 
code 
# 
Cum.    
% 
# 
Cum.    
% 
# 
Cum. 
% 
State # 
Cum. 
% 
# 
Cum. 
% 
# 
Cum. 
% 
IPO 
(year) 
# 
Cum. 
% 
# 
Cum. 
% 
# 
Cum. 
% 
73 269 16.89 88 20.09 181 15.67 CA 274 17.20 143 32.65 131 11.34 1990 23 1.44 9 2.05 14 1.21 
36 162 27.06 66 35.16 96 23.98 TX 129 25.30 20 37.22 109 20.78 1991 58 5.08 11 4.56 47 5.28 
28 151 36.53 65 50.00 86 31.43 NY 96 31.32 20 41.79 76 27.36 1992 88 10.61 19 8.90 69 11.25 
38 124 44.32 50 61.42 74 37.84 MA 86 36.72 46 52.29 40 30.82 1993 112 17.64 23 14.15 89 18.96 
35 94 50.22 31 68.49 63 43.29 FL 58 40.36 8 54.12 50 35.15 1994 87 23.10 13 17.12 74 25.37 
48 94 56.12 19 72.83 75 49.78 NJ 52 43.63 13 57.09 39 35.53 1995 106 29.76 15 20.54 91 33.24 
13 48 59.13 5 73.97 43 53.51 IL 45 46.45 15 60.51 30 41.13 1996 163 39.99 31 27.62 132 44.67 
37 37 61.46 7 75.57 30 56.10 PA 38 48.84 8 62.34 30 43.73 1997 135 48.46 22 32.64 113 54.46 
87 36 63.72 12 78.31 24 58.18 GA 34 50.97 10 64.62 24 45.81 1998 107 55.18 10 34.93 97 62.86 
50 33 65.79 4 79.22 29 60.69 MN 32 52.98 9 66.67 23 47.80 1999 141 64.03 40 44.06 101 71.60 
33 32 67.80 6 80.59 26 62.94 OH 32 54.99 2 67.13 30 50.40 2000 138 72.69 50 55.47 88 79.22 
59 32 69.81 13 83.56 19 64.59 CO 29 56.81 6 68.50 23 52.39 2001 31 74.64 12 58.21 19 80.86 
49 29 71.63 3 84.25 26 66.84 VA 29 58.63 6 69.87 23 54.38 2002 26 76.27 12 60.95 14 82.08 
20 27 73.32 3 84.93 24 68.92 CT 26 60.26 12 72.61 14 55.59 2003 20 77.53 9 63.01 11 83.03 
58 27 75.02 5 86.07 22 70.82 WA 26 61.90 12 75.35 14 56.80 2004 69 81.86 30 69.86 39 86.40 
80 25 76.59 3 86.76 22 72.73 MI 25 63.47 5 76.49 20 58.53 2005 87 87.32 33 77.39 54 91.08 
44 24 78.09 4 87.67 20 74.46 NC 23 64.91 6 77.87 17 60.00 2006 90 92.97 36 85.61 54 95.76 
51 23 79.54 2 88.13 21 76.28 MD 22 66.29 12 80.60 10 60.87 2007 112 100.00 63 100.00 49 100.00 
Others 326 100.00 52 100.00 274 100.00 AZ 20 67.55 5 71.74 15 62.17 Total 1,593 - 438 - 1,155 - 
Total 1,593 100.00 438 100.00 1,155 100.00 TN 20 68.80 4 82.65 16 63.56        
       MO 19 69.99 5 83.79 14 64.77        
       NV 15 70.94 1 84.02 14 65.98        
       IN 14 71.81 3 84.70 11 66.93        
       Others 449 100.00 67 100.00 382 100.00        
       Total 1,593 - 438 - 1,155 -        
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Table 3. Differences between VC backed (438 firms) and non-VC backed IPOs (1,155 firms) 
This table presents selection bias adjusted average indices measuring financial distress differences between VC- and non VC-backed IPO firms (Average effect of 
Treatment on the Treated— ATT), their standard errors and 95% confidence intervals. Each VC- backed IPO is matched with one or many control IPOs using the 
Kernel matching method. The estimates are based on the logarithm of total assets, the logarithm of age, two-digit SIC code dummies, and headquarter-state dummies. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are based on 50 replications by using Gaussian Kernel distribution. Bias-adjusted 95% confidence intervals appear below the standard 
errors.  
 Z’’-score Equity ratio ZM-score O-score 
Full Sample (1990-2007) 
ATT 5.087 0.128 -1.229 -1.695 
Standard Error 0.867 0.022 0.239 0.226 
Bias-adjusted (95%) [3.709;6.839] [0.077;0.164] [-1.807; -0.850] [-2.107; -1.104] 
Obs. treatment 2,567 2,567 2,567 2,567 
Obs. control 5,204 5,204 5,204 5,204 
T-statistic 5.864 5.816 -5.141 -7.504 
Sub-period (1990-1993) 
ATT -2.086 0.087 -0.874 -3.625 
Standard Error 3.259 0.027 0.211 1.495 
Bias-adjusted (95%) [-11.779; 1.846] [0.043; 0.127] [-1.217; -0.577] [-8.555; -1.961] 
Obs. treatment 319 319 319 319 
Obs. control 467 467 467 467 
T-statistic -0.640 3.249 -4.146 -2.424 
Sub-period (1994-1997) 
ATT 4.469 0.065 -1.012 -1.471 
Standard Error 1.341 0.022 0.287 0.715 
Bias-adjusted (95%) [2.793; 7.324] [0.0364; 0.099] [-1.521; -0.318] [-2.679; -0.035] 
Obs. treatment 444 444 444 444 
Obs. control 741 741 741 741 
T-statistic 3.332 2.952 -3.522 -2.058 
Sub-period (1998-2002) 
ATT 10.629 0.209 -2.274 -2.001 
Standard Error 3.162 0.071 0.701 0.757 
Bias-adjusted (95%) [6.098; 19.077] [-0.017; 0.302] [-3.988; -1.186] [-3.316; -0.429] 
Obs. treatment 700 700 700 700 
Obs. control 1,016 1,016 1,016 1,016 
T-statistic 3.362 2.924 -3.247 -2.642 
Sub-period (2003-2007) 
ATT 5.470 0.134 -1.227 -1.765 
Standard Error 2.145 0.062 0.386 0.531 
Bias-adjusted (95%) [2.834; 12.121] [0.059; 0.257] [-2.264; -0.606] [-4.273; -1.185] 
Obs. treatment 888 888 888 888 
Obs. control 828 828 828 828 
T-statistic 2.550 2.172 -3.182 -3.323 
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Table 4. Median values and median changes from the calendar year to five years later for VC- and non-VC-backed IPOs. Analysis 1 to 1 with control 
sample chosen on the basis of propensity score 
This table shows medians of the indices measuring financial distress – Z’’-score, Equity ratio, ZM-score, O-score– for a sample of US VC backed firms went public 
between 1990-2007 and for the respective control IPOs firms sample. The variables are presented for a time horizon of six years, starting from the year that firms 
went public (i.e., t=0) to five years after. The changes (i.e., (X t+i – X t=0) /X t=0 ; with X = Z’’-score, Equity ratio, ZM-score, O-score and i = 1…5) are measured from 
the year that firms went public through the fifth year following each it (year 0 to years 1, 2, 3,4 and5). It tests for the equality of distributions (Wilcoxon–Mann–
Whitney rank sum test) between the two groups of firms. Moreover, it tests whether the changes are significantly different from zero (denoted by asterisks) by using 
a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for medians. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Values Changes 
Z’’-score (lower values indicate a larger distress) 
Year (divestment year=0) t0 – t5 t= 0 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 0/1 0/2 0/3 0/4 0/5 
(1) VC-backed sample 4.21 6.15 4.53 3.93 3.61 3.54 3.29 -0.11*** -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.23*** -0.26*** 
(2) Control Sample 3.57 5.47 4.06 3.51 3.19 2.92 2.58 -0.11*** -0.20*** -0.35*** -0.43*** -0.45*** 
Wilcoxon test (1) vs. (2) 0.0032*** 0.4512 0.3565 0.2913 0.1635 0.2256 0.0530* 0.6950 0.6602 0.0474 0.0272 0.1733 
No. Observations (1) 1,896 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 
No. Observations (2) 1,896 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 
Equity ratio(lower values indicate a larger distress) 
Year (divestment year=0) t0 – t5 t= 0 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 0/1 0/2 0/3 0/4 0/5 
(1) VC-backed sample 0.68 0.74 0.71 0.68 0.66 0.64 0.62 -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.09*** 
(2) Control Sample 0.62 0.70 0.65 0.62 0.58 0.58 0.56 -0.01** -0.03*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.13*** 
Wilcoxon test (1) vs. (2) 0.0000*** 0.0836* 0.0718* 0.2656 0.0473** 0.1783 0.0193** 0.3627 0.3327 0.5735 0.6892 0.3431 
No. Observations (1) 1,896 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 
No. Observations (2) 1,896 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 
ZM-score (higher values indicate a larger distress) 
Year (divestment year=0) t0 – t5 t= 0 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 0/1 0/2 0/3 0/4 0/5 
(1) VC-backed sample -2.20 -2.62 -2.26 -2.05 -2.16 -2.00 -2.04 -0.06*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.16*** -0.21*** 
(2) Control Sample -1.83 -2.55 -2.05 -1.77 -1.53 -1.57 -1.47 -0.08*** -0.18*** -0.27*** -0.30*** -0.33*** 
Wilcoxon test (1) vs. (2) 0.0000*** 0.5109 0.3349 0.2553 0.0060*** 0.0155** 0.0033*** 0.6608 0.4194 0.0028 0.0317 0.3664 
No. Observations (1) 1,896 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 
No. Observations (2) 1,896 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 
O-score (higher values indicate a larger distress) 
Year (divestment year=0) t0 – t5 t= 0 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 0/1 0/2 0/3 0/4 0/5 
(1) VC-backed sample -1.36 -1.49 -1.28 -1.22 -1.37 -1.51 -1.30 -0.03 -0.06 -0.09** -0.13*** -0.24*** 
(2) Control Sample -0.78 -1.47 -0.93 -0.74 -0.58 -0.48 -0.67 -0.06* -0.19*** -0.31*** -0.38*** -0.31*** 
Wilcoxon test (1) vs. (2) 0.0000*** 0.2336 0.0961* 0.0480** 0.0003*** 0.0006*** 0.0010*** 0.3750 0.1518 0.0225 0.0867 0.3534 
No. Observations (1) 1,896 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 
No. Observations (2) 1,896 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 
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Table 5. Impact of VC on firm’s financial distress: Results from OLS regressions  
The dependent variables are Z”-score (columns I and II), Equity ratio (columns III and IV), ZM-score (columns V and VI) and O-score (columns VII and VIII). Age 
is the Natural logarithm of the firm age; Size is the natural logarithm of the total asset; Capex is Capital expenditures normalized by total assets; VC is a dummy 
variable which is set at 1 when firms are backed by a VC investor and 0 otherwise; GDP is the GDP growth rate between two consecutive years. State, Industry and 
Year dummies are included in estimates reported in columns II, IV, VI and VIII. Estimates are derived from OLS regressions with robust clustered standard errors. T-
statistics are reported in round brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Sample: 438 VC backed IPOs Vs. 1,155 control IPOs 
 lower values(dep.var.)indicate larger distress higher values(dep.var.)indicate larger distress 
 Z”-score Equity ratio ZM-score O-score 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) 
VC 5.157
***
 2.537
***
 0.173
***
 0.086
***
 -1.246
***
 -0.719
***
 -1.215
***
 -0.744
***
 
 (4.58) (2.59) (5.93) (3.60) (-4.71) (-3.35) (4.41) (-3.14) 
Age -1.245
***
 -2.555
***
 -0.057
***
 -0.074
***
 0.175
**
 0.414
***
 -0.104 0.232
*
 
 (-3.21) (-4.42) (-6.36) (-5.27) (2.33) (3.78) (-1.18) (1.80) 
Size 5.586
***
 7.722
***
 0.078
**
 0.116
**
 -1.113
***
 -1.439
***
 -1.735
***
 -2.077
***
 
 (4.34) (4.26) (2.22) (2.46) (-3.84) (-3.73) (-5.57) (-4.97) 
Capex -18.292 -19.661 -0.442 -0.348 1.889 1.873 2.637 3.294 
 (-1.15) (-0.94) (-0.97) (-0.57) (0.62) (0.47) (0.494) (0.64) 
GDP 2.368
***
 1.198
***
 0.049
***
 0.030
**
 -0.538
***
 -0.359
***
 -0.527
***
 -0.353
***
 
 (4.40) (2.68) (3.04) (2.25) (-3.45) (-2.85) (-3.54) (-2.90) 
_cons -33.621
***
 -14.872 0.078 0.537 6.175
***
 6.593 10.854
***
 8.217 
 (-3.96) (-1.00) (0.35) (1.58) (3.15) (0.85) (5.37) (1.53) 
State dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
No. of ob. 8,487 8,487 8,487 8,487 8,487 8,487 8,487 8,487 
No. of firms 1,593 1,593 1,593 1,593 1,593 1,593 1,593 1,593 
Adj R squared 0.0363 0.0611 0.0143 0.0310 0.0303 0.0484 0.0570 0.0792 
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Table 6. Results from OLS regressions after control for selection bias through a propensity score method  
The dependent variables are Z”-score (columns I and II), Equity ratio (columns III and IV), ZM-score (columns V and VI) and O-score (columns VII and VIII). Age 
is the Natural logarithm of the firm age; Size is the natural logarithm of the total assets; Capex is Capital expenditures normalized by total assets; VC is a dummy 
variable which is set at 1 when firms are backed by a VC investor and 0 otherwise; GDP is the GDP growth rate between two consecutive years. State, Industry and 
Year dummies are included in estimates reported in columns II, IV, VI and VIII. Estimates are derived from OLS regressions with robust clustered standard errors. T-
statistics are reported in round brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
 
Sample: 316 VC backed IPOs Vs. 316 non-VC backed-IPOs 
 lower values(dep.var.)indicate larger distress higher values(dep.var.)indicate larger distress 
 Z”-score Equity ratio ZM-score O-score 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) 
VC 2.414
**
 4.763
***
 0.111
***
 0.143
***
 -0.866
***
 -1.212
***
 -0.768
***
 -1.196
***
 
 (2.54) (2.68) (4.17) (3.46) (-3.13) (-2.97) (-2.85) (-3.05) 
Age -1.513
**
 -2.845
***
 -0.077
***
 -0.085
***
 0.208 0.445
**
 -0.259
*
 0.077 
 (-2.18) (-2.85) (-5.10) (-4.15) (1.41) (2.32) (-1.65) (0.39) 
Size 5.684
***
 7.366
***
 0.068
*
 0.099
**
 -1.192
***
 -1.517
***
 -1.850
***
 -2.120
***
 
 (3.62) (3.66) (1.88) (2.24) (-3.38) (-3.51) (-5.66) (-5.31) 
Capex -4.221 -0.005 0.133 0.372
***
 -3.262 -3.363 -4.336
**
 -2.612 
 (0.51) (-0.00) (1.19) (2.62) (-1.34) (-0.97) (-2.29) (-1.03) 
GDP 2.605
***
 0.875 0.057
**
 0.030 -0.672
**
 -0.411
*
 -0.610
**
 -0.352
*
 
 (3.31) (1.34) (2.09) (1.40) (-2.34) (-1.83) (-2.42) (-1.77) 
_cons -31.704
***
 -60.144
***
 0.165 -0.385 6.842
***
 12.695
***
 12.064
***
 14.146
***
 
 (-3.26) (-5.31) (0.65) (-1.56) (2.60) (4.46) (5.09) (4.49) 
State dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
No. of ob. 3,729 3,729 3,729 3,729 3,729 3,729 3,729 3,729 
No. of firms 632 632 632 632 632 632 632 632 
Adj R squared 0.0457 0.0919 0.0209 0.0678 0.0467 0.0895 0.0984 0.1499 
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Table 7. Median values of Interest Ratio variable for VC- and non-VC-backed IPOs. Control sample chosen on the basis of propensity score approach 
This table shows medians of the Interest Ratio (interest paid on total debt) for a sample of US VC backed firms went public between 1990-2007 and for the 
respective control IPO firms sample. The analysis is conducted by distinguishing between the best and the worst firms. Concerning Z’’-score, firms are grouped into 
three ranges on the basis of the three zones of discrimination identified by Altman. Instead, on the side of Equity Ratio, ZM-score and O-score, the analysis is 
conducted by comparing the first and the last quartile. Specifically, with regard to Equity Ratio variable, the first quartile highlights the worst firms and the last 
quartile the best firms in term of distress risk. Vice versa, with regard to ZM-score and O-score the first quartile highlights the best firms and the last quartile the 
worst firms in term of distress risk. It tests for the equality of distributions (Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney rank sum test) between the two groups of firms. ***, **, * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 VC-backed Sample (1) Control Sample (2) 
Wilcoxon test  
(1) vs. (2) 
 Z’’-score based analysis  
 Distress Zone:  Z’’-score < 1.1 
Interest Ratio 4.99% 6.02% 0.0835* 
No. Observations 461 463  
 Grey Zone: 1.1 < Z’’-score < 2.6 
Interest Ratio 4.87% 5.57% 0.0917* 
No. Observations 206 219  
 Safe Zone: Z’’-score > 2.6 
Interest Ratio 3.23% 4.46% 0.0000*** 
No. Observations 984 941  
 Equity ratio based analysis 
 Worst firms: 1
st
 Quartile - Equity ratio  
Interest Ratio 4.89% 5.82% 0.0005*** 
No. Observations 408 497  
 Best firms: 4
th
 Quartile - Equity ratio  
Interest Ratio 3.13% 4.52% 0.0195** 
No. Observations 381 328  
 ZM-score based analysis 
 Best firms: 1
st
 Quartile - ZM-score  
Interest Ratio 2.13% 3.79% 0.0013*** 
No. Observations 395 342  
 Worst firms: 4
th
 Quartile - ZM-score  
Interest Ratio 5.31% 6.02% 0.0716* 
No. Observations 401 466  
 O-score based analysis 
 Best firms: 1
st
 Quartile - O-score  
Interest Ratio 2.29% 3.58% 0.0032*** 
No. Observations 413 343  
 Worst firms: 4
th
 Quartile - O-score  
Interest Ratio 5.67% 6.20% 0.7650 
No. Observations 352 444  
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Table 8. Results from OLS regressions by distinguishing between bank affiliated and independent VCs  
The dependent variables are Z”-score (columns I and II), Equity ratio (columns III and IV), ZM-score (columns V and VI) and O-score (columns VII and VIII).  
Bank VC is a dummy variable which is set at 1 when firms are backed by a lead VC that is a bank affiliated investor and 0 otherwise;  Independent VC is a dummy 
variable which is set at 1 when firms are backed by a lead VC that is an independent investor and 0 otherwise;  Age is the Natural logarithm of the firm age; Size is 
the natural logarithm of the total asset; Capex is Capital expenditures normalized by total assets; GDP is the GDP growth rate between two consecutive years. State, 
Industry and Year dummies are included in the estimates. Estimates are derived from OLS regressions with robust clustered standard errors. T-statistics are reported 
in round brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Z”-score Equity ratio ZM-score O-score 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) 
Bank VC 5.849
**
  0.166
**
  -1.565
**
  -1.015  
 (2.03)  (2.47)  (-2.36)  (-1.56)  
Independent VC  3.473
***
  0.098
***
  -0.790
***
  -0.961
***
 
  (2.63)  (3.12)  (-2.61)  (-3.15) 
Age -3.592
***
 -3.577
***
 -0.099
***
 -0.099
***
 0.596
***
 0.592
***
 0.235 0.231 
 (-2.98) (-2.98) (-4.00) (-4.00) (2.59) (2.59) (1.00) (0.99) 
Size 8.259
***
 8.256
***
 0.119
**
 0.119
**
 -1.716
***
 -1.717
***
 -2.340
***
 -2.334
***
 
 (3.60) (3.59) (2.34) (2.34) (-3.47) (-3.47) (-5.13) (-5.11) 
Capex -1.659 -2.309 0.384
**
 0.366
**
 -3.363 -3.217 -2.877 -2.693 
 (-0.15) (-0.20) (2.55) (2.42) (-0.92) (-0.88) (-1.09) (-1.02) 
GDP 0.919 0.922 0.032 0.032 -0.437
*
 -0.438
*
 -0.376
*
 -0.377
*
 
 (1.33) (1.34) (1.41) (1.41) (-1.84) (-1.85) (-1.80) (-1.80) 
_cons -46.033
**
 -52.443
**
 0.132 -0.048 7.818 9.333 11.142
**
 12.771
**
 
 (-2.01) (-2.11) (0.25) (-0.08) (1.46) (1.60) (2.03) (2.16) 
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of ob. 3,508 3,508 3,508 3,508 3,508 3,508 3,508 3,508 
No. of firms 595 595 595 595 595 595 595 595 
Adj. R squared 0.0988 0.0990 0.0733 0.0735 0.0965 0.0965 0.1577 0.1585 
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Table 9. Median values: High and Low reputation of VCs.  
This table shows medians of the indices measuring financial distress – Z’’-score, Equity ratio, ZM-score, O-score– , Z’’-score sub-rations (W.Cap./Asset, which is 
the ratio between working capital and total assets, Ret. Earn./Asset, which is the ratio between retained earnings and total assets, EBIT/Asset, which is the ratio 
between EBIT and total assets and Book value/TL, which is the ratio between book value and total liabilities), ROA, EBITDA/Asset  and Age for a sample of US VC 
backed firms went public between 1990-2007. The analysis compares the outcomes of firms backed by high and low reputable VCs, based on the funds raised, that 
are classified as described in section 5.2. The variables are based on a time horizon of six years, starting from the year that firms went public to five years after. It 
tests for the equality of distributions (Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney rank sum test) between the two groups. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
     
lower values indicate a 
larger distress 
higher values indicate a 
larger distress 
Panel A:VC reputation based on funds raised        
 ROA EBITDA/Asset Age Book Value Z”-score Equity ratio ZM-score O-score 
        
(1) High-Reputation 0.09 0.15 11.00 161.65 2.54 0.51 -1.39 -0.94 
(2) Low-Reputation 0.03 0.07 10.00 106.13 4.70 0.71 -2.43 -1.53 
Wilcoxon test (1) vs. (2) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0022*** 0.0038*** 0.0062*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.4027 
No. Observ. (1) 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 
No. Observ. (2) 990 990 990 990 990 990 990 990 
 
 Z’’-score sub-rations  
Panel B: VC reputation based on funds raised  
 X1=W.Cap./Asset X2= Ret. Earn./Asset X3=EBIT/Asset X4=Book value/TL CL/CA 
      
(1) High-Reputation 0.16 -0.02 0.09 1.04 0.56 
(2) Low-Reputation 0.44 -0.15 0.03 2.37 0.32 
Wilcoxon test (1) vs. (2) 0.0000*** 0.0003*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
No. Observ. (1) 234 234 234 234 234 
No. Observ. (2) 990 990 990 990 990 
 
  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
42 
 
Table 10. The impact of VC’s reputation on firm’s financial distress risk: Results from OLS regressions 
The dependent variables are Z”-score (columns I and II ), Equity ratio (columns III and IV), ZM-score (columns V and VI) and O-score (columns VII and VIII).  VC 
Reputation is a dummy variable which is set on 1 when the VC is among the top 50 VC firms in terms of funds raised five years before the VC-backed firm listing. 
VC Reputation_x_Stake is the product between the VC Reputation and lead VC’s Stake of equity in the portfolio firm as of the listing date. Age is the Natural 
logarithm of the firm age; Size is the natural logarithm of the total asset; Capex is Capital expenditures normalized by total assets; GDP is the GDP growth rate 
between two consecutive years. State, Industry and Year dummies are included in the estimates. Estimates are derived from OLS regressions with robust clustered 
standard errors. T-statistics are reported in round brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Sample: 316 VC backed IPOs 
 lower values(dep.var.)indicate larger distress higher values(dep.var.)indicate larger distress 
 Z”-score Equity ratio ZM-score O-score 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) 
VC Reputation -2.336
***
  -0.246
***
  1.302
***
  0.940
***
  
 (-3.25)  (-7.32)  (5.32)  (3.00)  
VC Reputation_x_Stake  -4.514
***
  -0.439
***
  2.371
***
  1.541
**
 
  (-3.02)  (-6.93)  (5.21)  (2.43) 
Age -1.252
***
 -1.219
**
 -0.029
**
 -0.0258
**
 -0.182 -0.202 -0.505
***
 -0.522
***
 
 (-2.61) (-2.52) (-2.42) (-2.01) (-1.36) (-1.48) (-2.83) (-2.89) 
Size 2.103
***
 2.092
***
 -0.031
***
 -0.031
***
 -0.196
**
 -0.200
**
 -0.879
***
 -0.875
***
 
 (6.89) (6.76) (-3.19) (-3.00) (-2.10) (-2.09) (-8.34) (-8.03) 
Capex 0.091 -0.590 0.442
***
 0.364
***
 -3.163
***
 -2.752
**
 -1.845 -1.480 
 (0.02) (-0.15) (3.47) (3.01) (-2.77) (-2.48) (-0.94) (-0.76) 
GDP 0.241
*
 0.246
*
 0.013
**
 0.013
**
 -0.141
***
 -0.143
***
 -0.149
***
 -0.150
***
 
 (1.76) (1.77) (2.38) (2.41) (3.41) (-3.41) (-2.85) (-2.83) 
_cons -7.547
*
 -11.486
**
 0.684
***
 0.165
*
 0.138 4.228
**
 -0.480 10.670
***
 
 (-1.67) (-2.10) (6.18) (0.82) (0.13) (2.40) (-0.27) (4.50) 
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of ob. 1,213 1,183 1,213 1,183 1,213 1,183 1,213 1,183 
Adj. R squared 0.3868 0.3895 0.5198 0.5180 0.3838 0.3827 0.4836 0.4803 
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Table 11. VC Reputation and the issuer risk of financial distress: disentangling the screening and treatment effects 
This table presents 2-step Heckman (1979) regression coefficients and in parentheses associated t-statistics (i.e. z-statistics in the case of probit regression) based on 
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity. In a 1st step, a probit regression is estimated for the likelihood of a firm receiving backing from a more reputable 
VC. Specifically, VC Reputation is set on 1 when the VC is among the top 50 VC firms in terms of funds raised five years before the VC-backed firm listing. The 
instrumental variables are VC Firm Experience and Nearby Firm. All the variables are defined in Appendix. The Inverse Mills ratio estimated from the 1st-step 
regression is used in the following 2nd-step regression model: 
 
y = β0 + β1 Market Share VC Firm + β2Age + β3Size + β4Capex 
+ β5GDP+ ΣβiState Dummies + ΣβjIndustry Dummies +  
β6Inverse Mills + ε, 
 
where y is the financial distress risk measures, and the Market Share VC Firm is the endogenous covariate.. *, **, and *** denote coefficient estimates significantly 
different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
 Pr(Reputable VC=1) Z’’-score Equity ratio ZM-score O-score 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
Market Share VC Firm  -2.811
***
 -0.165
***
 1.033
***
 0.604 
  (-3.45) (-3.66) (3.41) (1.63) 
VC Firm Experience 0.822
***
     
 (9.92)     
Nearby Firm 0.638
***
     
 (3.04)     
Age 0.0240 -0.965
*
 -0.0381
**
 -0.0710 -0.125 
 (0.25) (-1.71) (-2.32) (-0.45) (-0.61) 
Size 0.0946
*
 2.001
***
 -0.0285
***
 -0.191
**
 -0.971
***
 
 (1.87) (6.78) (-2.85) (-2.13) (-9.04) 
Capex 2.628
***
 -1.413 0.637
***
 -3.342
**
 -1.501 
 (3.06) (-0.34) (3.53) (-2.55) (-0.85) 
GDP 0.0319 0.362
**
 0.0173
**
 -0.117
**
 -0.0688 
 (1.00) (2.45) (2.53) (-2.47) (-1.07) 
Inverse Mills  -1.126 0.0180 0.164 -0.0622 
  (-1.27) (0.75) (0.65) (-0.20) 
State Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons -4.158
***
 -3.255 -0.423 6.021
***
 5.683
**
 
 (-6.47) (-0.77) (-1.16) (2.67) (2.42) 
No. of ob. 729 723 723 723 723 
Adj R squared 0.2752 0.2171 0.2956 0.2881 0.4239 
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Table 12. The impact of VC’s reputation on the Z”-score components: Results from OLS regressions 
The dependent variables are W.Cap./Asset, which is the ratio between working capital and total assets (columns I and II), Ret. Earn./Asset, which is the ratio between 
retained earnings and total assets (columns III and IV), EBIT/Asset, which is the ratio between EBIT and total assets (columns V and VI) and Book value/TL, which is 
the ratio between book value and total liabilities (columns VII and VIII).  VC Reputation is a dummy variable which is set on 1 when the VC is among the top 50 VC 
firms in terms of funds raised five years before the VC-backed firm listing. VC Reputation_x_Stake is the product between the VC Reputation and lead VC’s Stake of 
equity in the portfolio firm as of the listing date. Age is the Natural logarithm of the firm age; Size is the natural logarithm of the total asset; Capex is Capital 
expenditures normalized by total assets; GDP is the GDP growth rate between two consecutive years. State, Industry and Year dummies are included in the estimates. 
Estimates are derived from OLS regressions with robust clustered standard errors. T-statistics are reported in round brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Sample: 316 VC backed IPOs 
 W.Cap./Asset Ret. Earn./Asset EBIT/Asset Book value/TL 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) 
VC Reputation -0.149
***
  -0.179
*
  0.040
*
  -0.996
***
  
 (-5.26)  (-1.69)  (1.69)  (-3.22)  
VC Reputation_x_Stake  -0.303
***
  -0.283  0.092
**
  -2.114
***
 
  (-5.75)  (-1.38)  (2.14)  (-3.05) 
Age -0.052
***
 -0.049
***
 -0.063 -0.059 0.074
***
 0.073
***
 -1.145
***
 -1.143
***
 
 (-4.05) (-3.72) (-0.85) (-0.80) (6.58) (6.54) (-4.74) (-4.71) 
Size -0.039
***
 -0.037
***
 0.624
***
 0.623
***
 0.077
***
 0.077
***
 -0.186
*
 -0.200
*
 
 (-4.38) (-4.11) (10.78) (10.62) (8.17) (7.98) (-1.82) (-1.94) 
Capex -0.391
***
 -0.437
***
 1.566
**
 1.516
**
 0.009 0.020 -2.392 -2.667 
 (-4.07) (-4.56) (2.50) (2.43) (0.09) (0.20) (-1.28) (-1.42) 
GDP 0.011
**
 0.011
**
 0.044
**
 0.045
**
 0.009
**
 0.009
**
 -0.031 -0.031 
 (2.37) (2.41) (2.18) (2.20) (2.55) (2.51) (-0.44) (-0.42) 
_cons 0.504
***
 0.743
***
 -2.663
***
 -4.874
***
 -0.481
***
 -0.549
***
 1.004 3.071 
 (4.13) (4.18) (-4.56) (-5.44) (-3.56) (-3.41) (0.36) (1.10) 
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of ob. 1,213 1,183 1,213 1,183 1,213 1,183 1,213 1,183 
Adj. R squared 0.4411 0.4416 0.5323 0.5302 0.5243 0.5180 0.4155 0.4155 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Description of variables 
Variables Symbol Description 
Dependent variables   
   
Financial distress indicator 1 Z’’-score Altman, Hartzell and Peck model (1995) to predict financial distress. A higher Z’’-score 
value indicates a lower financial distress risk 
a
 
Financial distress indicator 2 
 
ZM-score Zmijewski model (1984) to predict financial distress. A higher ZM-score value indicates a higher 
financial distress risk 
a 
Financial distress indicator 3 O-score Ohlson model (1980) to predict financial distress. A higher O-score value indicates a higher 
financial distress risk 
a 
Financial distress indicator 4 Equity ratio Book value of total equity normalized by total assets. A higher Equity ratio value indicates a lower 
financial distress risk 
a 
Independent variables 
 
  
VC backing VC Dummy variable which is set at 1 when firms are backed by a VC investor and 0 otherwise 
b
 
Length of PE investment LI Natural logarithm of the number of years between the investment time and the divestment time 
b
 
VC Nature Bank VC Dummy variable which is set at 1 when firms are backed by a lead VC that is a bank affiliated 
investor and 0 otherwise
b
  
VC Nature Independent VC Dummy variable which is set at 1 when firms are backed by a lead VC that is an independent 
investor and 0 otherwise
b 
VC Syndication Syndication Dummy variable which is set on 1 if at the time of offering there are more than one VCs with 
equity position in the target firm, and 0 otherwise 
c 
VC Reputation VC Reputation An indicator variable for highly ranked lead VCs that takes value 1 if the VC firm, for the 
corresponding time window, is among the top 50 VC firms for market share (funds raised) and 
zero otherwise 
VC firm Stake Stake Lead VC’s stake of equity in portfolio firm as of the listing datec  
Market share VC Firm Market share VC Firm Market share of VC firm for funds raised five year prior the listing of the corresponding backed 
firm 
b 
Interaction VC Reputation 
and Stake 
VC Reputation_x_Stake Product between VC Reputation-FR and Stake
b 
a 
Source: COMPUSTAT                                                                                                                                                                                                          (continued) 
b 
Source: THOMSON ONE 
c
 Source: IPO PROSPECTUS 
d 
Source: FACTIVA 
e 
Source: WORLD BANK 
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Table A1. Continued 
 
Variables Symbol Description 
Independent variables   
   
Size Size Natural logarithm of the total asset 
a
 
Age Age Natural logarithm of the firm age 
b,d
 
Capital expenditures Capex Capital expenditures normalized by total assets
 a
 
GDP growth rate GDP The GDP growth rate between two consecutive years 
e
 
Industry dummies Industry dummies A set of dummy variables describing the industrial sectors and each of which takes the value 1 if 
the firm operates in the corresponding sector, and zero otherwise
 a
 
State dummies State dummies A set of dummy variables describing the territorial differences and each equal to 1 if the firm 
operates in the corresponding State, and zero otherwise
 a
 
Year dummies Year dummies A set of dummy variables each equal to 1 if the firm went public in corresponding in the 
corresponding Year, and zero otherwise
 a
 
   
Instrumental Variables   
   
VC Firm Experience VC Firm Experience Natural logarithm of VC firm age measured as the difference between VC backed firm IPO date 
minus VC firm incorporation date
b 
VC firm - VC backed firm 
distance 
Nearby Firm An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the lead VC is headquartered in the same state as 
the issuer, and 0 otherwise
b,c 
a 
Source: COMPUSTAT 
b 
Source: THOMSON ONE 
c
 Source: IPO PROSPECTUS 
d 
Source: FACTIVA 
e 
Source: WORLD BANK 
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Highlights 
 Studies value that venture capitalists bring to IPO firms 
 Finds VC-backed IPOs experience less financial distress risk post-offering than do comparable non-VC-backed IPOs Provides strong 
evidence of service differentiation 
 Finds companies backed by more reputable VCs exhibit higher levels of financial distress risk even when they show superior operating 
performance, due their highly levered capital structure and investment in relatively illiquid assets 
 Findings are robust to alternate measures of VC reputation and other measures of financial distress risk 
